Release 2000/02/27 CIA-RDP78-01634R000100070016-7

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH BEPARTMENT OF STATE

A-1588 Aprèl 15,1958

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Reference is made to the Embassy's telegrams Nos. 5878 and 5891 of March 26 concerning the stated belief of several COCOM delegations that the US dollar is one of the most "strategie" items, and that failure to control it is a significant loophole in the control system. It is noted also that the Italian and United Kingdom delegates have inquired as to the US method of settling its trade deficit with the Soviet bloc, particularly with China.

The following discussion deals with the questions raised by the Italian and UK Delegations, and should not be regarded as a complete statement of the US position on the adoption of financial measures as a supplement to physical transit controls.

If the question of dollars as a strategic export is to be discussed, it is necessary to consider the balance of payments between the United States and the Soviet bloe. These data are set forth below separately for the European Soviet bloc and Communist China. For purposes of balance of payments consideration, attention should be given to the full figures for United States exports, including re-exports, and to general imports, not imports for consumption, the latter of which would include withdrawals from warehouses.

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TABLE I

Balance of Eur	opean Sc	viet Bloc	Co	unties.	1951	BIIC	CITE
	(in	thousands	of	dollar	9)		Net

• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •			Net
	Credits	Debits	Balance
Current transactions			
Merchandise trade	9,945	63,569	-53,624
Travel	3/	2/	
Government expenditures	3,5004/	5,100	- 1,600
Frivate remittances5/		12,500	-12,500
Interest on US Govt. credits.	4,500	•	£ 4,500
Income on private investments	.	200	- 200
Balance on current account		*	-63,424
Capital transactions			
Renayment of US Govt.credits.	,		≠ 1,200
Renayment of private short term claims		,	¥ 1,000
Net securities transactions			- 112
Net reduction in dollar balances			- 6.600
Balance on capital account			- 4,512
Balance on all known transacti	ons	<u>.</u> .	-67,936

Source: US Department of Commerce

2/ Known to be substantially less than \$400,000.

5/ Chiefly to Poland and Hungary.

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^{1/} Commercial shipments totalled only \$2,858,000. The difference of over \$7 million is accounted for by an estimate of the value of merchandise transferred to this area through gift parcel shipments.

Less than \$50,000.

Very rough estimate; no direct information available.

Does not include direct contributions to the UN.

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It should be noted that roughly 70 per cent of total US imports (\$27.4 million) from the USSR in 1951 were furs. Under the ban imposed by Section 11 of the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951 on imports of certain furs, some 35 to 40 per cent of 1951 shipments will be eliminated in 1952. Regarding US imports from Czechoslovakia which in 1951 amounted to \$22.4 million, such imports have been drastically curtailed because of special circumstances existing in our relations with that country. This situation might, however, be changed at any time.

The following tabulation summarizes the balance of payments with Communist China.

TABLE II

Balance of Payments Between the United States and China (ex. Formosa) 1951 (In thousands of dollars)

United States exports	nil	or u	nknown
United States imports		-46	,4871/
Travel (unknown but insignificant)			•
Private remittances		(=)	100
Income on investments in United States		(-)	900
Net transactions in securities		#	252
Net movement of short term claims and liabilities		· <u>~</u>	200
Balance on all known transactions		-4	7,435
Source: US Department of Commerce			

^{1/} Based on country of origin of goods, according to Customs regulations.

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The US Delegation is, of course, completely femiliar with the Foreign Assets Control Regulations governing United States trade with and payments to Communist Chine. The large balance shown above is accounted for as follows.

When the UE froze Chinese Communist assets in December 1950 there were sizeable quantities of Chinese Communist goods which had already left China and which were then in the hands of legitimate traders, payment having already been made to Communist China. Accordingly, the US Treasury Department followed a fairly liberal licensing policy until March 1951 to prevent undue hardship to these traders. In addition, Treasury freely licensed throughout the year the importation of four commodities needed by the US Government for the strategic stockpile (hog bristles, water fowl feathers and down, silk waste, and tungsten). None of these were purchased directly from China, the dollar payments accrued to some third country. In fact, some of these purchases were made in Western Furone, which suggests that in some cases European Soviet bloc middlemen might have received the resultant US dollar payments rather than Communist China.

The statistics on imports from Communist China are as follow:

Total for year	- \$46,487,000		
of which 4 stockpile items were	22,274,000		
January-June total	31.769.000		
of which stockpile all other	10,735,000 21,034,000		
July-December total	14,718,000		
of which stockpile all other	11,539,000 3,179,000		

The large imports of "all other" items in the first helf of the year reflects the liberal Treasury licensing policy during the first three months of 1951. The \$3 milliom "all other" figure in the second helf represents the residue of licenses issued during the first quarter and hardship cases.

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The Treasury Department has taken blocking action against a number of European banks whose facilities were being used to carry on dollar transactions for the benefit of Communist China. Treasury is prepared to take similar action in any other cases of this sort which may arise. The cooperation of European governments in developing and dealing with such cases would of course be welcomed.

There is a presumption that a good nortion of the total balances shown above on all known transactions is available to Soviet bloc countries for financing subversive activities and illegal trade, but there is no conclusive evidence regarding how much of the total might be used thus. A portion of the total undoubtedly is used to finance commercial purchases in Latin America and elsewhere. The USSR may have the gold to purchase any amount of US dollars it needs in free currency markets, but it should be remembered that practically every country of the Free World, narticularly the COCOM countries, has some form of export controls which prevent or limit Soviet bloc countries from purchasing strategic commodities with US dollars or any other currency. The effectiveness of these controls would, of course, be enhanced by physical controls over transit trade and transshipments in certain free ports of continental Europe.

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Clearances:

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